Japan\u27s Development Assistance in Timor-Leste by Katsumi Ishizuka & Lloyd Steven
―　119　―
Abstract
　　This paper is a discussion of Japan's aid relations with Timor-Leste. It first takes a historical 
approach, examining Japan's changing attitude towards Timor-Leste. Japan's recent aid has tended 
to be apolitical, avoiding contentious areas that might be more beneficial for the long-term develop-
ment of the new state. Despite this, research carried out by the Japanese government and the UN 
suggest that Japanese aid is seen by local people in a positive light.
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1. Introduction 
　　Japan is increasingly directing its foreign policy towards a more pro-active role, both regional-
ly and globally. In part due to natural inclination and partly due to Constitutional limitations, Japan 
often works under United Nations auspices. Japan's recent activities in Timor-Leste (formerly and 
more commonly known as East Timor), provide a good case study of Japan taking a leading role in 
conjunction with the UN and other international partners. The amount of follow-up research in 
Timor-Leste on these development efforts will help development policy makers improve their aid 
structures and the quality of the aid delivered.
　　In this paper, we first briefly outline Japan's historical relations with Timor-Leste up to the 
present. Next we examine Japan's development assistance and the role of the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) in Timor-Leste, and the policy evaluation carried out by the UN, JICA 
and the Japanese Government. Next, we discuss development projects jointly carried out by Japan 
and the UN. Finally, we conclude that although Japan avoids involving itself in projects that ad-
dress the causes and consequences of conflict, it has a positive image amongst local people.
2. A Brief History of Japan's Relationship with Timor-Leste
　　The history of Japan's relationship with Timor-Leste goes back to World War II. During this 
period, Timor-Leste was known as Portuguese Timor. During World War II, Portuguese Timorese 
fought against the Japanese advance towards Australia. In East Timor: a rough passage to inde-
pendence, James Dunn argues that:
　　As a result of the Allied intrusion in December 1941 and the subsequent military opera-
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tions in the territory, East Timor was one of the great catastrophes of World War II in terms 
of relative loss of life. Having in mind the human cost alone, Portuguese Timor suffered far 
worse than any other South-East Asian country occupied by the Japanese.1
　　In fact, the battle against Japan led to a great loss of life. In 1930, Portuguese Timor's popula-
tion was 472,221. The figure for 1947 showed that it had fallen to 433,412. Therefore, almost 
40,000 Timorese died as a result of the War - over 8% of the population.2 
　　On 7 December 1975, more than 1,000 Indonesian army commandos parachuted into East 
Timor's capital of Dili in the first wave of an attack in which the Indonesian troops secured the air-
port, military headquarters and the former Portuguese administrative building within four hours.3 
About 2,000 inhabitants of Dili, 8 per cent of the city's population, were killed in the first days of 
the Indonesian invasion. This was the first episode of Indonesia's involvement in East Timor. On 22 
December 1975, UN Security Council Resolution 384 (1975) on the situation in East Timor was 
unanimously adopted. Resolution 384 recognised the inalienable right of the people of East Timor 
to self-determination and independence and called upon the Indonesian Government to withdraw 
without delay all its forces from the territory. Japan was one of the non-permanent members of Se-
curity Council. In the debate of the UN Security Council concerning Resolution 384, the stance of 
Japan, which had long-standing economic ties with Indonesia, was completely pro-Indonesia and 
anti-Timor. A Japanese representative to the Security Council debate stated that life in East Timor 
was gradually returning to normal, and that Indonesia was widely acknowledged as firmly support-
ing the right to self-determination of the peoples in colonial states. He also said that the Japanese 
Government was assured that Indonesia had no claims on East Timor and that it respected the right 
of the people of East Timor to self-determination.4 Japan's behaviour in the Security Council was 
very clear: its geo-political and economic relations with Indonesia convinced it not to take the East 
Timor issue any further.
　　In addition to the two UN Security Council Resolutions (Resolution 384 (1975) and 389 of 
1976), there were eight General Assembly Resolutions5 on the situation in East Timor. In the votes 
of the eight General Assembly Resolutions condemning Indonesia's actions, Japan consistently vot-
ed alongside India, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand in support of Indonesia. It should be noted 
that Japan had not only economic but also political relations with Indonesia. The Indonesia political 
leader Sukarno had supported Japanese imperialism during the 1930s and the 1940s and his succes-
sor Suharto had also maintained an intimate relationship with his Japanese counterparts.
　　Another reason for Japan showing little sympathy towards East Timor was ideological. It was 
widely perceived that Fretilin, which was the political party in East Timor strongly supporting inde-
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pendence, was linked with left-wing groups in Portugal and Africa. Therefore, the Japanese Gov-
ernment feared that an independent East Timor might become a regional “Cuba”, threatening Asian 
security.
　　However, since Japan's response to East Timor's problem was in part originally ideologically 
related, the end of the Cold War naturally affected Japan's policy towards East Timor and Indonesia. 
Japan's policy change was ignited by an incident, the “Santa Cruz massacre” of 1991. On Novem-
ber 12, 1991, Indonesian troops opened fire on groups of East Timorese as they walked from Mo-
tael Church to the Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili to place flowers on the grave of one East Timorese 
shot dead by troops at the church two weeks earlier. Reportedly, about 180 people were killed and 
many injured.6 The Japanese Government was shocked at this incident, and the Japanese Ambassa-
dor in Jakarta informed the Indonesian Defence Minister that he could not promise the incident 
would not affect Japan's ODA to Indonesia.7
　　The 1997 East Asian currency crisis provided a significant opportunity for East Timor. A stock 
market crash resulted in the Indonesian currency, the rupiah, devaluing by 50%. The following eco-
nomic turmoil led to mounting debt and rising unemployment in Indonesia. On 12 May 1998, the 
killing of four university students by the Indonesian military triggered mass riots targeting the Chi-
nese community. The riots resulted in military intervention, and these events terminated Suharto's 
regime which had lasted for 32 years. The then commander-in-chief, General Wiranto, brokered a 
handover of power between Suharto and the Vice President, B.J. Habibie.8 Habibie took a concilia-
tory stance towards East Timor's issue. On 27 January 1999, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas 
announced that his government was prepared to accept immediate independence for East Timor if 
the East Timorese rejected the autonomy proposal offered by Indonesia. His announcement trig-
gered Japan's first public reaction to Habibie's East Timor policy, and the Japanese Government 
welcomed the decision and proclaimed its hopes for a peaceful solution in East Timor.9
　　On 5 May 1999, the so-called “5 May Agreement” was signed by Indonesia, Portugal and the 
UN, enabling the UN Secretary-General to hold a referendum on Indonesia's autonomy package on 
8 August 1999. Therefore, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established 
by UN Security Council Resolution 1246 on June 11 to organise and conduct the referendum. Send-
ing three civilian police officers and a few more liaison officers for UNAMET was the first contri-
bution of Japan to East Timor's peace-building process.10 Furthermore, Japan, as well as Australia, 
New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, constituted a Core Group of coordinating 
support of UNAMET. Coordination ranged from practical efforts to get UNAMET established to 
the critical day-to-day diplomacy geared towards the referendum of August 1999. Japan also con-
tributed funding to UNAMET, enhancing its engagement and information; and Japanese ministers 
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and officials visited East Timor during the referendum term.11
　　However, there was a huge anti-independence campaign by militias during the referendum pe-
riod. They maintained the strong suspicion that the result was engineered by the UNAMET. After 
the referendum, on 4 September 1999 UNAMET announced that 78.5 percent of the East Timorese 
voters rejected the Indonesian Government's autonomy proposal, with 21.5 per cent voting for it. 
Within hours of the announcement, pro-integration militias predictably began attacking pro-inde-
pendence supporters. Accordingly, on 15 September, the UN Security Council authorised an Aus-
tralian-led multinational force (INTERFET) to restore peace and security in East Timor. However, 
by the time the first INTERFET forces were deployed, thousands of East Timorese had already 
been killed from before and after the referendum, and over 500,000 people in East Timor from a 
population of only 800,000 had been displaced.  200,000 of these had crossed the border and be-
come refugees in West Timor. In Dili, 70 to 80 per cent of the business district buildings had been 
burnt. Therefore, East Timor had to create its nation from scratch and needed massive international 
assistance for peace and nation-building from major donors like Japan. 
3. Japan's Development Assistance in Timor-Leste
3.1 Government's Decision
　　Japan has contributed to national development in East Timor with like-minded donors in the 
recognition that stability and development in East Timor is significant for peace and stability in the 
entire region. Japan's enthusiasm to assist the development of nation-building in East Timor can be 
recognized by the fact that Japan became the first host government of the Donors' Conference for 
East Timor. In the meeting, Japan pledged 130 million dollars of financial aids over three years for 
the development for East Timor. (100 million dollars for development, and 30 million dollars for 
humanitarian assistance). In the sixth Donor's Conference for East Timor in Dili, the Japanese Gov-
ernment pledged another 60 million dollars of financial aid over three years. Since then Japan has 
strengthened its bilateral relationship with East Timor. In April and May 2006 when serious riots 
happened in Dili, Japan responded to UN's emergency appeal, giving 50 million dollars for resolv-
ing the riots. Furthermore, in February 2007 Japan provided 720,000 dollars of grant aids for the 
coming presidential and parliamentary elections. 
　　The Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially states that Japan's development assistance in East 
Timor consists of following four priority areas: 1. Agriculture and Rural Development; 2. Mainte-
nance and Improvement of Infrastructure; 3. Human Resources Development and Institution Build-
ing; and 4. Consolidation of Peace.12 Most of them have been conducted by the Japan International 
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Cooperation Agency (JICA), through the finance of ODA.
Table 1. Japan's ODA in East Timor (million dollars)
Year Technical Assistance Grant Aid Total
2001  8.6  0.33  8.93
2002  4.93  0.81  5.74
2003  5.62  3.31  8.93
2004  3.82  6.06  9.88
2005  5.48  27.93  33.41
Total  28.87  67.51  96.38
(Sources: JICA, 5 June 2007)
　　As can be seen from Table 1, the amount of Japan's ODA in East Timor has been increasing. 
Especially, 27.93 million dollars of grant aid in 2005 was the eight largest amount among the Asian 
states. This figure is considered relatively significant for a micro-state of East Timor. Even China's 
grant aid from Japan in 2005 was 34.03 million dollars.13 
3.2 JICA's Analysis and Implementation
　　In July 2002, JICA published a comprehensive report called A Study of the Framework for 
Assistance of Effective Reconstruction and Development. This report analyzed several needs 
for the effective reconstruction and development process comparing the cases of Cambodia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and East Timor. This research categorized such needs into three types: (A) areas which 
caused the conflicts but have not been solved; (B) areas which was caused by the conflicts and 
would relapse unless solved; and (C) areas which were not directly related to the conflicts but need 
to be solved for reconstruction. The result of the analysis and the subsequent JICA's project imple-
mentation are as follows in Table 2.
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Table 2. Areas, Needs and Categories for Reconstruction in Timor-Leste, and JICA's Projects
Areas Needs for Reconstruction Categories JICA's Projects
Emergency Assistance
Refugee Repatriation B Nil
Confrontation between pro- and 
anti-independence group A Nil
Legal commitment to ex-militiamen A Nil
Postponement of repatriation by 
anti-independence group B Nil
Security Maintenance
Absence of security organizations B Training local police
Procrastination of demobilization in 
West Timor B Nil
Social Infrastructure
Wrecked infrastructure (road, electric-
ity, water etc.) C
Investigation of emergency reconstruc-
tion and infrastructure maintenance. 
Investigation of detabase of geography 
information for emergency reconstruc-
tion.
Investigation of water supply system.  
Collapse of education system C
Reconstruction assistance for the 
Department of Engineer at the Univer-
sity of East Timor.
Assistance for making the curriculum 
of the Department of Engineer. 
Deteriorated medical and sanitation 
system C
Reconstruction Programme of medical 
system in East Timor. 
Alliance of Friends for Medical-care in 
East Timor. 
Health Education Promotion Project in 
Ermera District.
Environmental destruction C Environmental Conservation Project in Dili and Liquica.
Governance
Underdeveloped human rights standard A Nil
Dispute on property rights A Nil
Absence of common language B Nil
Absence of elite group C
Dispatching staff in UNTAET. Group 
seminars in Japan. 
Group seminars in the third countries
Underdeveloped judicial system C Group seminars in the third countries
Underdeveloped financial system C Nil
Economic 
Reconstruction
Increasing unemployed people B Nil
Underdeveloped agricultural and 
industrial sectors C
Investigation of development pro-
gramme for agriculture, forestry and 
fishery. 
Providing agricultural machinery. 
Dispatching specialists. Reconstruction 
of rice farming and development 
programme.
Collapse of transportation system C Reconstruction programme of transpor-tation system in Dili market
Poverty in rural areas C Reconstruction programme of economy in agricultural and fishery villages
Aid for the Vulnerable
Trauma C Nil
Improvement of women's status C Nil
(Sources: JICA, A Study of the Framework for Assistance of Effective Reconstruction and Development, July 2002)
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　　It can be said that in 2002 JICA's projects were relatively extensive although most of them 
were categorized (C), the areas which were not directly related to the conflicts but need to be solved 
for reconstruction. Therefore, JICA's projects were not strictly related to the conflicts but were gen-
uinely oriented by development. At present, the implementation of JICA's projects has not been 
changing significantly. According to its annual reports, in terms of Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment, JICA works on improving productivity and marketing of rice and coffee. It also works with 
both government and local communities to realize sustainable development by assignment of policy 
advisor at the central government level as well as at community level. JICA has especially focused 
on the projects called Irrigation & Rice Project in Manatuto District.14
　　As far as Maintenance and Improvement of Infrastructure is concerned, JICA has been en-
gaged in technical cooperation to improve capacity building of the public sector. In 2006, JICA im-
plemented three technical projects, the Project for the Capacity Building of Road Maintenance, the 
Project for Capacity Development by Training and Preparation of Guidelines and manual Roads, 
and the Project for Capacity Development of Teaching Staff in the Faculty of Engineering.15
　　In the sector of Human resources Development and Institution Building, JICA launched a proj-
ect for the training of civil servants called the Project for Strengthening of Capacity of the National 
Institute of Public Administration (INAP). JICA also arranged third country training programs in 
collaboration with ASEAN countries such as Japan Singapore Support Program, Malaysia Techni-
cal Cooperation Program, Thailand Cooperation Program and Philippine Cooperation Program.16 
　　Regarding Consolidation of Peace, JICA has been working closely with the Policia National 
de Timor Leste (PNTL) for Koban police box system, Japan's community police system, and Com-
munity Protection Unit Posters as well as sending Timorese official to training courses in Malaysia 
for Consolidation of Peace for Post-conflict Countries.17
3.3 Statistical and Policy Evaluations
　　In October 2003, JICA was reorganized and Sadako Ogata, who was previously the head of 
the UNHCR, was appointed the new president of JICA. Ogata recognized that development assis-
tance should be highly related to the post-conflict process in peace-building and advocated and 
pledged to reform JICA.18 Ogata is also well known as an advocate of the concept of human securi-
ty. Therefore, the interface of development assistance, peace-building and human security should be 
the main theme for the international community. However, as described above, the implementation 
of projects by JICA in Timor-Leste has still been genuinely development-oriented, and has not been 
positively involved in areas which caused the conflicts or areas which were caused by the conflicts. 
Following field research carried out by Ishizuka in Timor-Leste in March 2007, JICA is highly rec-
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ommended to have a stronger commitment to the sectors including human rights standards, judicial 
system, employment, and disputes on property rights.
　　Meanwhile, Table 2 gives the results of questionnaires for local people on Japan's development 
assistance in the war-torn areas in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia and East Timor. The figures in 
the table are the points of the local people in each area who answered “very helpful” to each area 
which Japanese contingents such as JICA staff conducted for development. It is clear that Japan's 
development assistance in East Timor has been very successful, compared with Afghanistan and Sri 
Lanka, even better than Cambodia. It can be said that JICA's four priority areas, mentioned above, 
were all positively assessed by local people.
Table 3. Japan's Development Assistance in War-torn Areas in Asia
(Points of local people who answered "very helpful")
Afghanistan
(100)
Sri Lanka
(100)
Cambodia
(102)
East Timor
(103)
Refugee repatriation 39 32 45 72
Dispatching specialists for rural development 24 31 76 76
De-mining 54 36 76 41
Monitoring elections 57 22 65 52
Improving law enforcement 36 22 65 52
Training civil administrators 28 28 59 65
Anti-corruption training 27 23 51 64
Reforming police service 19 22 46 60
Dispatching specialists for decommission 47 13 17 44
Dispatching specialists for the handicapped 33 36 34 66
Improving rehabilitation centers 41 36 46 62
Dispatching specialists for agricultural policy 33 30 64 66
Instructing agricultural skills 33 33 72 66
Providing agricultural machinery 30 42 73 76
Improving irrigation system 33 44 76 66
Maintenance of power stations 27 38 83 63
Road and port construction 59 47 59 67
Dispatching specialists for medical policy 38 34 50 56
Dispatching specialists for infectious diseases 39 32 43 62
Building schools 66 51 65 70
Education for women 44 32 44 60
Dispatching specialists for job-training 32 37 46 52
(Sources: MOFA, Preventing Conflicts, 2005)
　　Large scale UN peace operations intervened for the nation-building process in the cases of 
Cambodia and East Timor, called UNTAC and UNTAET, respectively, and both cases are relatively 
successful in the entire development process, as can be seen in Table 2. Therefore, as mentioned 
above, it is significant for JICA to co-operate with UN peace-building missions for the successful 
implementation of its mission. This is partly because the successful implementation of development 
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assistance requires local security and stability, which can be protected by UN peacekeeping forces. 
In fact, there are no UN peacekeeping forces in Sri Lanka, and although there is a UN peace opera-
tion in Afghanistan (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: UNAMA), security is pro-
vided by a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and security is still fragile 
there. Another reason why JICA and UN peace-building should go hand in hand is because both of 
them are currently sharing the same values in operations such as human security and local owner-
ship.
　　In fact, the interface of JICA and peace-building is in the national interest of Japan. For exam-
ple, Julie Gilson, a British scholar on Japanese foreign policy, points out several benefits accruing 
from the Japanese Government connecting aid issues, including that of JICA, with peace-building 
in its foreign policy. First, the normative underpinnings of aid disbursement and calls for democra-
tization in post-conflict peace-building operations rest on similar premises and as such do not re-
quire Japan to redefine the terms of debate over when peace operations are acceptable. Second, one 
of Japan's goals is to obtain a greater international presence. By linking the aid debate to that of 
peace-building and extending the scope of the former, Japan is trying to be seen to be making a 
valuable contribution and taking a proactive position on reconstruction.19 
3.4 Operational Evaluations: the projects of the Government of Japan (JICA) and UNDP
　　In 2002, the Evaluation Office in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan jointly published an extensive report called Post-Conflict 
Assistance in Kosovo and East Timor. It focused on the post-conflict development assistance 
provided by the Japanese Government (JICA) through the UNDP in Kosovo and East Timor, in par-
ticular on specific projects, and made concrete evaluations and presented several lessons learnt from 
them. These projects for East Timor were as follows:
● Dili Water Supply System and Improvement ($11,280,000-24 months)
● Urgent Rehabilitation of the Dilli-Ainaro Cassa Road ($4,700,000-17 months)
● Irrigation Rehabilitation Projects ($3,360,000-10 months)
● Rehabilitation of Small Power Stations in Rural Areas ($2,390,000-13 months)
● Maintaining the Output Capacity of the Comoro Power Station ($3,100,000-13 months)
● Urgent Rehabilitation Project of Restoration of Navigation Aids and Fender System at the 
Port of Dili ($2,650,000-10 months)
　　This report initially presented several significant factors necessary for success in post-conflict 
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development assistance and applied them to the case of East Timor for evaluation. Among the fac-
tors, the report pointed out the significance of “beneficiary involvement”. That is, development as-
sistance tends to be supply-driven. This problem has been identified in East Timor. For example, 
the donors in East Timor, such as JICA and USAID, reportedly changed their strategy without any 
wider consultations in accordance with the change in the security situation in East Timor. For ex-
ample, USAID increasingly focused more on economic development and democratization than 
food security as the security situation in East Timor improved. However, the NGOs sponsored by 
USAID could not respond to such a transition strategy quickly, and their original aid was still de-
manded by local people.20 The report pointed out a similar problem on the project to rehabilitate an 
irrigation system in the Manatuto District:
　　In this initial formulation, this project very possibly could not take into the high vol-
ume of water that would be needed urgently by rapidly returning farmers and on a year-
around basis. Beneficiaries engaged in a political process to secure changes in project design 
and sequencing and these have met with some difficulties on the donor side. It is likely this 
situation could have been prevented had needs been more fully articulated at the outset.21
　　Therefore, the evaluation team recommended that the Japanese Government and UNDP should 
ensure initial and repeated consultation with beneficiaries. Similarly, it is important to keep stake-
holders, beneficiaries and the general public informed of intentions, commitments and progress 
with respect to the assistance planned or being provided.22 This problem was identified through field 
research by Ishizuka in the IDP (internally displaced person) camps in Dili, in March 2007. At that 
time, UNDP provided shelters to the IDPs, who had abandoned their houses for fear of retaliation 
for the so-called “East-West” confrontations, which directly triggered the serious riots that occurred 
in April and May 2006. Initially, according to the contract with UNDP, it would provide new shel-
ters every three months. However, this contract was not implemented by UNDP. This was partly be-
cause UNDP had expected that the riots would have been resolved much earlier, and partly because 
the Government of Timor-Leste was reluctant to continue permitting such IDP camps in Dili. The 
Government considered that the presence of the IDP camps was the cause of the delay in ending the 
riots. However, the government's view was far from realistic and the IDPs had to continue using the 
old shelters for more than 10 months. They complained about it to a Japanese NGO, a subcontractor 
of JICA and UNDP, only to find the problem was still unresolved. This is an example of a lack of 
consultation and coordination between beneficiaries (local people), subcontractors (NGOs), and 
main donors (JICA, USAID or UNDP).23
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　　The official report from UNDP and the Japanese Government also emphasized the significance 
of timeliness from their experience in East Timor. When the above-mentioned six East Timor proj-
ects were signed in Dili in July 2001, the delay in receiving the funds was apparent and negatively 
perceived at the country level. Cost-incurring project activities could not begin, and could not begin 
with any assurance of when those cost commitments would be met. The evaluation team criticized 
the funding process for the six projects was unreasonably slow. Therefore, the team strongly sug-
gested that internal safeguards should be created by donors for delivering post-conflict assistance 
on schedule.24
　　Furthermore, most of the projects in East Timor faced the sustainability problem. They suf-
fered from a shortage of requisite technical and management skills. This was largely because the 
grant aids provided only for training strictly necessary to furnish the specified assistance.25
　　In this context, in 2003, a UNDP programme sponsored by the Japanese Government, was 
launched nation-wide to supported vulnerable groups in East Timorese society, such as ex-combat-
ants, widows, unemployed youths and others, known as Recovery, Employment and Stability Pro-
gramme for Ex-combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste (RESPECT). RESPECT itself is not a 
programme which creates employment; it plays a role as a coordinator. There exists a tendency to 
seek ad hoc and short-term measures to improve employment opportunities in developing nations 
such as East Timor. Many people have not been informed or are even ignorant of where they should 
go to get jobs. Furthermore, the principle of equal distribution of employment opportunity is diffi-
cult during economically and socially unstable periods. Especially, many ex-combatants are disad-
vantaged when competing for jobs in civilian life. Therefore, fair, neutral and informative coordina-
tors with expertise, skills and a long-term vision, such as provided by RESPECT, are very 
necessary in East Timor. According to Satoru Miyazawa, a director of RESPECT in Dili, there is 
not only a necessity for immediate job creation for vulnerable groups such as ex-combatants and 
jobless youths, but also the necessity of community participation and commitment to the creation of 
conditions for the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into society and of a sustain-
able livelihood for other vulnerable groups. He described RESPECT as adopting a self-target ap-
proach. Communities with their leaders should ensure that the most vulnerable groups would be 
given priority access to opportunities arising from the activities of the RESPECT program.26 It can 
be said that RESPECT is a positive case of a joint project between the Japanese Government and 
UNDP.  
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4. Discussion & Conclusions
　　One of the first observations that can be made from the foregoing is the huge contrast in Ja-
pan's attitude in the periods preceding and following 1999 and the UN sponsored referendum. This 
was due to a number of factors including the ending of the Cold War and Indonesia's (nominal) ac-
ceptance of Timorese independence. Although not discussed above, growing Chinese and South 
Korean interest in the region may also have been a factor. The active participation of the United 
Nations legitimized Japanese participation and gave it a structure within which to operate. To this 
extent, Japan's role in Timor-Leste is similar to the role it plays in other international conflicts: that 
of partner in a multi-national (and preferably UN-led) peace-keeping operation.
　　As Table 3 above shows, Japan's aid is viewed positively by local people, and generally scores 
higher than it had done in previous operations. Clearly, Japan is learning lessons from its experi-
ence and putting these to good use. 
　　Several conclusions or recommendations can be drawn from this investigation. Firstly, it is es-
sential that Japan continue to carry out follow-up analysis of programs and consultation with local 
people throughout and after the whole process. Secondly, once a project has been approved funds 
should be made available more quickly than at present so that trust in the process and Japan's aid 
agencies amongst local people can be maintained. In much the same way, it is important that benefi-
ciaries are able to have a genuine role in the process, both for reasons of trust and making the aid 
more effective. More specifically for Timor-Leste and other war-torn countries, Japan should con-
centrate its efforts more on peace-building and nation-building.
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